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A PRIMER ON THE ELEMENT OF MENTAL STATE IN
THE MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973
Jeff Essman
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana's present code lacks any unified classification of offenses
and is difficult to use. It is inconsistent, ancient, and obsolete and
demonstrates a desperate need in Montana for a modern criminal
code. The basic purpose to be achieved by the proposed code is to
provide a simplified, comprehensive, and systematic body of crim-
inal law which will serve as a useful instrument of social control
in a modern community.'
This statement, contained in the foreword to the proposed Montana
Criminal Code of 1973,2 succinctly articulated the problems of Mon-
tana's old criminal statutes and the underlying concept of the new
laws. A simple analysis can be applied to the statutory offenses in
the new code to identify the material elements of proof required for
conviction. All offenses, except those which impose absolute liabil-
ity, require proof of an act 3 and a mental state.' Certain crimes, such
as homicide5 and assault,' also require the state to establish the
elements of cause and result.' This note will examine the treatment
of the element of mental state in the Montana Criminal Code of
1973, and will discuss two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
1. Hon. Wesley Castles, FOREWORD TO REVISED PROPOSED MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF
1973,2 (1972).
2. LAWS OF MONTANA (1973) ch. 513 (MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973, Title 94, REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA (1947), Effective January 1, 1974).
3. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 94-2-102.
Voluntary Act. A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an
omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically
capable of performing. Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or
received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have
been able to terminate his control.
4. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-103. General requirements of criminal act and mental state.
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute
liability unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense,
he acts while having one (1) of the mental states described in sections 94-2-101(28), 94-2-
101(32), and 94-2-101(53).
5. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-101.
6. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-201.
7. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-105. Causal relationship between conduct and result.
(1) Conduct is the cause of result if:
(a) without the conduct the result would not have occurred; and
(b) any additional causal requirements imposed by the specific statute defining the
offense are satisfied.
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Montana in which the mental state element was at issue, State v.
Jimison' and State v. Klein.'
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MENTAL STATE ELEMENT
Montana's approach to the element of mental state originated
in the Model Penal Code. Herbert Wechsler, the Chief Reporter of
the Model Penal Code, wrote:
American law has employed an abundance of mens rea terms, such
as general and specific intent, malice, wilfulness, wantoness, reck-
lessness, scienter, criminal negligence and the like-exhibiting
what Mr. Justice Jackson in a famous Supreme Court opinion
called "the variety, disparity and confusion" of "definitions of the
requisite but elusive mental element." Clarification was essential
and it was attempted by a bold submission in the draft. 0
To alleviate the confusion, the Model Penal Code recognized only
four kinds of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and neg-
ligence. I I
The Commission which drafted the new Montana code also
relied on the Illinois Criminal Code of 196112 as a source of many
provisions. 3 Although similar to the draft provisions of the Model
Penal Code, the Illinois definition of mental states included several
significant changes. 4 The Illinois commission replaced the term
"purposely" with the term "intent" although the substance of the
"purposely" definition was retained. 5 The Illinois version of
"knowledge" included awareness of the existence of a material fact
as part of its definition, in addition to the Model Code provision
defining "knowledge" as awareness of conduct, circumstance, and
result. 6 Illinois also changed the definition of "negligence" by im-
posing liability for a substantial deviation from the reasonable per-
8. State v. Jimison, - Mont. - , 540 P.2d 315 (1975).
9. State v. Klein, - Mont. -, 547 P.2d 75, (1976).
10. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (1968) citing Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
252 (1952). See also State v. Klein, supra note 9 at 288.
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). As used here
"culpability" means only moral responsibility for the conduct. It is not used in the popular
sense as equivalent to criminal guilt.
12. ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, 1963 [hereinafter cited Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963], ch. 38.
13. Hon. Wesley Castles, FOREWORD TO THE REVISED PROPOSED MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE
OF 1973, 2 (1972).
14. Committee Comments-1961 (Revised by Charles H. Bowman) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963,
§ 4-3 (Smith-Hurd Ann. ed. 1972).
15. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, § 4-4. Intent. A person intends, or acts intentionally or with
intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the
offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that
conduct.
16. Il. Rev. Stat. 1963, § 4-5. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962).
[Vol. 37
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son standard, instead of the gross deviation required by the Model
Penal Code. 7 Unfortunately, the Illinois code failed to make a clean
break from the antiquated terminology of the common law and
included the terms "wilfully" and "wantonly" as the equivalents of
"knowingly" and "recklessly"."
Another source of mental state definitions for the new Montana
code was the 1965 revision of the New York Penal Law." The New
York definitions of "recklessly" and "negligently" mirrored the
Model Penal Code in requiring a gross deviation from the reasonable
person standard for liability. 0
III. THE MENTAL STATE ELEMENT IN THE MONTANA CODE
The old criminal statutes of Montana contained an abundance
of mental state terms.2' The treatment of mental state was further
complicated by case law."2 To free the new code from those difficul-
ties, the Montana Criminal Law Commission followed the Model
Penal Code and revisions of Illinois and New York in adopting a
specific statutory treatment of the mental state element.
The Montana code uses only three classifications 3 in evaluat-
ing the defendant's mental state: purposely,24 knowingly," and neg-
17. I1. Rev. Stat. 1963, § 4-7; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
18. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, §§ 4-5 and 4-6. See also Committee Comments-1961 (Revised
by Charles H. Bowman) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd Ann. ed. 1972).
19. MONTANA CRIMINAL LAW COMMISSION, MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973, ANNOTATED
§ 94-2-101(32) at page 52 (W.F. Crowley ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited MONT. CRIM. CODE
ANN.].
20. NEW YORK PENAL LAW 1965, § 15.05; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) and (d) (1962).
21. E.g., wilfully, feloniously, and maliciously, RC.M. 1947, § 94-502; with intent to
kill, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-601; with intent to injure, wrongfully, with intent to commit a felony,
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-602; corruptly, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-804; knowingly, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-908;
fraudulently, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1501; with malice aforethought, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2501;
deliberate and premeditated, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2503; with intent to deprive and defraud,
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701; carelessly and negligently, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-3210; intentionally,
R.C.M, 1947, § 94-3313; ignorantly, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-3505. All repealed by Laws of Montana
(1973) ch. 513, § 32.
22. For a discussion of case law complication of specific intent under the old assault
statute see Note, Criminal Assault in Montana: A New Face for an Old Code, 35 MONT. L.
REV. 178 (1974).
23. See State v. Klein, supra note 9 at 78; MONT. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 94-2-103 Comment
at page 95.
24. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(53). "Purposely"-A person acts purposely with respect to
a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object
to engage in that conduct or cause that result. When a particular purpose is an element of
an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condi-
tion negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
Equivalent terms such as "purpose" and "with the purpose" have the same meaning.
25. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(28). "Knowingly"-A person acts knowingly with respect
to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware
of his conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the
result of conduct described by the statute defining an offense if he is aware that it is highly
19761
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ligently.25 These mental state classifications are defined in relation
to four objectively measurable conditions or occurrences: conduct,
circumstances, facts, and result.2 7 However, all four criteria do not
apply to each mental state.2 1 "Purposely", which means with a con-
scious objective, relates to conduct or result.29 "Knowingly", defined
as "awareness", relates to conduct, circumstances, facts or result."
"Negligently" relates only to circumstances and result.3 Thus, two
functions are performed in analyzing a statute which describes an
offense: first, determining which mental state must be proved,32 and
second, determining to which of the four conditions or occurrences
the mental state relates.
A simple example will clarify how these conditions are used to
evaluate mental state. Defendant, angered by an insult he received
while drinking at a local tavern, retrieves a loaded revolver from his
pickup truck. Upon returning to the crowded bar, he shouts, "No-
body calls me a liar," and fires two shots. One shot kills the person
who made the insult. The second injures a person standing a short
distance behind the first victim.
probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware
of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms such as "knowing" or "with knowl-
edge" have the same meaning.
26. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(32). "Negligently"-A person acts negligently with respect
to a result or circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he consciously
disregards a risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; or if he disregards
a risk of which he should be aware that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that to disregard it involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
Gross deviation means a deviation that is considerably greater than the lack of ordinary care.
Relevant terms such as "negligent" and "with negligence" have the same meaning.
27. The Model Penal Code used only conduct, circumstance, and result as defining
criteria. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comments at page 124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The
addition of "facts" as a criterion is due to the adoption of the Illinois version of "knowledge".
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963 § 4-5.
28. Much of the following statutory explanation was developed from the lectures and
classroom material of Professors W.F. Crowley and Larry M. Elison of the University of
Montana School of Law, both of whom served on the Montana Criminal Law Commission.
29. MONT. CIuM. CODE ANN. § 94-2-101(28) comment at 46. See text of statute supra
note 22.
30. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(28) See text supra note 23. Note also that awareness of a
particular fact is satisfied if objective indications point to a high probability that defendant
was aware. Since the definition was amended by Laws of Montana (1975) ch. 443, awareness
of a result is satisfied if there is knowledge that the occurrence of the result is highly prob-
able.
31. R.C.M. 1947, § 94.2-101(32). See text supra note 24. The wording of the negli-
gence definition comes primarily from the New York source, but also borrows language from
the Model Penal Code. It should be noted that this definition includes the concept of "reck-
lessness" with the phrase "consciously disregards..." Under the New York law, reckless-
ness is a higher mental state than negligence. Since the distinction between negligence and
recklessness is often difficult for juries to make, it has been avoided in the Montana code.
MONT. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 94-2-101(32) comment at 52.
32. Note that if a single mental state is indicated by the statute, it must be established
in relation to each element of the offense. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-103(2).
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"Conduct" involves the actions of the defendant: his acts of
retrieving his weapon, making his statement, and firing the shots.
"Circumstances" are the conditions surrounding the conduct in
question: the crowded nature of the tavern, the position of the by-
stander near the intended victim. "Facts" are legal or physical reali-
ties that might be important to evaluate the prohibited conduct as
expressed in the statute defining the offense: the shooting victims
were human beings,3 3 the revolver was a weapon. 31 "Result" is the
end product of the prohibited conduct: the death of the first victim,
the injury of the bystander.
To convict the defendant of deliberate homicide" or aggravated
assault," the state must prove he acted either purposely or
knowingly. Whether the defendant acted purposely with regard to
the homicide is determined by examining his conduct and the re-
sult. If it appears by objective determination that it was the con-
scious object of the defendant to fire his weapon or to cause the
death of the victim, the mental state of purposely has been proven.
Applying the same analysis to the wounding of the bystander,
all four criteria may be used to determine if the defendant acted
"knowingly" in commission of the aggravated assault. If the defen-
dant was aware that he fired (conduct) his weapon (fact), was aware
of the bystander's position (circumstance), and was aware that it
was highly probable that injury might result to another (result) the
mental state of knowingly has been proven. The defendant's mental
state is thus determined by objective assessment of the factors spec-
ified by the statutory design.
IV. THE CASES
Two recent Montana cases deal with the issue of mental state
in the new criminal code. The first, State v. Jimison,17 involved a
conviction for two counts of theft. The decision reversing the convic-
tions turned on the peculiar facts of the case. The defendant admit-
tedly had possession of the stolen articles prior to January 1, 1974,
the effective date of the new code.3" However, he was charged with
theft39 under the new code on the theory that he had exerted unau-
33. Under R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-101, a legal fact which is required by the statutory
definition is that the victim must be a human being. See also R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-101(22).
34. Under R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-202(1)(b), a legal fact required by the statutory defini-
tion is that a weapon was used to cause the bodily injury. See also R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-
101(66).
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-102.
36. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-202.
37. State v. Jimison, supra note 8.
38. Record at 164, State v. Jimison, supra note 8.
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302.
19761
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thorized control over the goods on June 5 and 6, 1975,111 when the
goods were seized on defendant's ranch. The court concluded that
since some of the elements of the crime had occurred prior to the
effective date of the new code, the transition statute" required the
state to prosecute under the old receiver of stolen property statute. 2
The opinion contained troublesome dicta in a directive to the
county attorneys of Montana:
Second, for future guidance, the state is in error in its argument
as it pertains to proof of criminal intent through proof of taking
and the exercise of control as sufficient proof to support a convic-
tion of theft under the new code. This is a specific intent crime and
the proof required is that for specific intent. In the instant case,
suspicious circumstances in connection with the control do not
meet this burden of proof, after an unrefuted explanation of pos-
session by the defendant. [Emphasis added]43
This enigmatic reference to theft as a specific intent crime raised
the possibility that the court may have reinstated in the new code
the concept of specific intent with all its analytical problems.
The term "specific intent" was commonly used to designate the
special intention that is required for guilt of a particular offense in
addition to the intentional performance of the prohibited act." It
was distinguished from "general intent", usually defined as the
mental state necessary for commission of a crime. 5 The distinction
varied because the terms were used inconsistently. Use of "spe-
cific" as an adjective for "intent" was criticized as superfluous since
an essential characteristic of any intention is that it is directed
toward a definite end. 47
40. See Note, Receiving Stolen Property: State v. Watkins and the New Criminal Code,
35 MONT. L. REV. 172 (1974) for a discussion of prosecution of the old crime of receiving stolen
property under the new theft statute.
41. LAWS OF MONTANA (1973) ch. 513, § 33. The Montana Criminal Code and all other
provisions of this act are effective January 1, 1974 and shall apply to all offenses alleged to
have been committed on or after that date. The Montana Criminal Code and all other
provisions of this act do not apply to offenses committed prior to its effective date and
prosecutions for such offenses shall be governed by prior law, which is continued in effect for
that purpose, as if the act were not in force. For purposes of this section, an offense was
committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the elements of the offense occurred
prior thereto.
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2721. Repealed by LAWS OF MONTANA (1973) ch. 513, § 32.
43. State v. Jimison, supra note 8 at 317.
44. State v. Fitzpatrick, 149 Mont. 400, 427 P.2d 300, 301 (1967); CLARK & MARSHALL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 5.06 (7th ed. 1967); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 762 (2d ed. 1969); W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 202 (1972).
45. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, Handbook on Criminal Law 201 (1972).
46. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, Handbook on Criminal Law 201 (1972), see J. HALL, GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 141-145 (2d ed. 1960), Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea,
52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 926 (1939).
47. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 142 (2d ed. 1960).
[Vol. 37
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The drafters of the Model Penal Code termed the concept of
specific intent "awkward"," found general intent to be "an abiding
source of ambiguity and confusion in the penal law", 49 and aban-
doned the terminology.50 In place of distinctions which were not
useful for determining the defendant's mental state, the new Mon-
tana code, following the Model Penal Code, creates a simple system
for mental state analysis. The design uses a limited number of terms
with appropriate qualifying language throughout the code.', The
Jimison dicta, therefore, threatened to defeat the Commission's ef-
fort to simplify treatment of the mental state element.
Closer analysis of Jimison, however, suggests an interpretation
which would preserve the mental state design of the new code.
Theft52 is one of the few offenses which requires proof of two mental
state elements.13 Beside proving the defendant purposely or know-
ingly exerted unauthorized control over the property of the owner,
the state must prove one of three additional requirements in the
subsections of the statute. 4
The first subsection5 5 requires proof of the purpose to deprive,
the traditional mental state of theft. The second and third subsec-
tions involve special situations where it is difficult to prove the
specific purpose to permanently deprive. 6 To satisfy the require-
ments of the second subsection, the state must prove an act, plus
an additional mental state. That is, the use, concealment, or aban-
donment of the property so as to deprive the owner must be per-
formed purposely or knowingly.57 The last subsection is similar to
the second, but reduces the mental state requirement to that of
"knowing" the acts will "probably" deprive the owner. 58 ,59
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 128 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
50. W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 202 (1972).
51. MONT. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 94-2-103 comment at 96, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2-103 Com-
mission Comment.
52. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302. Theft. (1) A person commits the offense of theft when he
purposely or knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of the owner,
and:
(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(b) purposely or knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such a manner
as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment, or aban-
donment will deprive the owner of the property.
53. Another offense which requires proof of two distinct mental states is aggravated
kidnapping, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-303.
54. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302(1)(a),(b), or (c). See text of statute supra note 52.
55. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302(1)(a).
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302. Commission Comment.
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302(l)(b).
58. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302(1)(c).
59. See Note, The Old Montana Dilemma and the New Approach to Larceny by Trick
1976]
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Unfortunately, in Jimison, the state's brief, quoted at length by
the Court,60 contained a poorly phrased explanation of the theft
statute:
All that is necessary to support a conviction for theft under 94-6-
302 is some exercise of control over the property of the owner. That
exercise need not be for any particular length of time but rather,
any length of time which is sufficient to show an intent to deprive
the owner of the use of the property is sufficient. [Emphasis by
the court]"
The court's directive about the specific intent nature of theft is
apparently in response to the state's misstatement of the law. The
court's response must be considered in light of the dual mental state
requirement of the theft statute. When thus considered, the court's
language may be viewed as an attempt to emphasize that one of the
three additional requirements had to be proved. In other words, the
court said that the state cannot meet the burden of proof by showing
mere intent to control "through proof of taking and the exercise of
control ... "2 when the additional purpose to deprive is demanded
by the statute.
This analysis of the court's dicta is supported by the later deci-
sion of State v. Shults.6 3 In ruling the offense of unauthorized use
of motor vehicles64 is a lesser included misdemeanor of theft, the
court said, "unauthorized use of the automobile is the common
element in both the original charge and the amended charge, the
[theft charge] requiring the additional element of an intent or
purpose to deprive the owner of his property." (Emphasis added) 5
In State v. Klein,68 the Montana supreme court directly ad-
dressed the issue of the mental state element. The defendant ap-
pealed from a conviction of robbery. 7 He contended that the jury
must consider "specific intent" as well as "purposely" and "know-
ingly". He maintained the district court erred in refusing instruc-
and Obtaining Goods by False Pretenses, 35 MONT. L. REV. 161, 168 (1974) for a comprehen-
sive discussion of the new theft statute.
60. State v. Jimison, supra note 8 at 316.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 317.
63. State v. Shults, - Mont. -, 544 P.2d 817 (1976).
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-305.
65. State v. Shults, supra note 63 at 819.
66. State v. Klein, supra note 9.
67. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-401. Robbery. (1) A person commits the offense of robbery if,
in the course of committing a theft, he:
(a) inflicts bodily injury upon another; or
(b) threatens to inflict bodily injury upon any person or purposely or knowingly puts
any person in fear of immediate bodily injury; or
[Vol. 37
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tions offered to that end." The court answered the question raised
by the Jimison dicta in rejecting those contentions.
The court said, in construing the robbery statute:
The proscribed conduct under section 94-5-401(1)(b) is "threatens
to inflict bodily injury upon any person or. . . puts any person in
fear of immediate bodily injury." However, such conduct is crimi-
nal only if done "purposely" or "knowingly". Therefore the specific
intent required before a conviction for the crime of robbery may
be had is that the accused must have acted either "purposely" or
"knowingly" .6
It is apparent the court did not use the term "specific intent" in its
traditional sense. Instead, it used the term as a shorthand expres-
sion for "mental state", the term preferred by the drafters of the
new code. 0 The court rejected the proposition that any mental state
beyond that required by the statutory scheme need be proved." It
appears the court will properly require proof only of the statutory
elements of the offenses, thus rejecting any call to return to the
common law definitions of the crimes.72
Consistent use of "specific intent" as synonymous with "men-
tal state" will probably avoid the possibility raised by Jimison that
the new code would be interpreted as a simple recodification of the
old criminal law offenses troubled with the same analytical prob-
lems. However, progress and consistency in the analysis and appli-
cation of the new code in Montana will be promoted if the court and
members of the bar stop using the outdated terminology of the old
law. The analytical mischief the new criminal code attempts to
remedy should not be permitted to slip back into the law through
inadvertent or careless use of language.
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Criminal Code of 1973 classifies the mental state
elements of criminal offenses in three terms: purposely, knowingly,
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony, other than theft.
(3) "In the course of committing a theft" as used in this section includes acts which
occur in an attempt to commit or in the commission of theft, or in flight after the attempt or
commission.
68. State v. Klein, supra note 9 at 78.
69. Id. at 78.
70. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-2-103, 94-2-104, 94-2-107(l), and Commission Com-
ments under the following statutes: R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-2-102, 94-2-103, 94-2-109, and 94-2-
110. However, even the Commission was not free from lapses into usage of the old terminol-
ogy. The annotation the court cited in Klein, supra note 9 at 78, referred to "specific intent"
instead of mental state, also.
71. State v. Klein, supra note 9 at 288.
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1-104(2) and Commission Comment thereunder.
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and negligently. The mental states are objectively measured against
four criteria: conduct, circumstances, facts, and result. Jimison
raised the possibility that the new code would be affected by the
maladies of the old criminal statutes, but Klein laid that concern
to rest by demonstrating that the Montana supreme court now uses
the term "specific intent" as a synonym for "mental state". To
insure that the new code will serve as a useful instrument of social
control, the bench and bar of Montana must recognize and imple-
ment the changes in analysis and application of the criminal law,
especially in the determination of the defendant's mental state.
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